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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTE-CAL LAND DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant, 
Case No. 16017 
ROBERT R. SATHER and 
BONNIE LEE SATHER, 
Defendants, Appellants 
and Cross-Respondents.: 
CROSS-APPELLANTS' BRIEF OF APPEAL 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT OF 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
HONORABLE DAVID SAM, JUDGE 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involved the ownership in real property 
situate in Uintah County, State of Utah. Plaintiff claims 
damages from defendants for taking possession of said property, 
including punitive damages for willful and malicious mis-
conduct in obtaining possession. Defendants Sather claim 
reimbursement from the plaintiff for money with interest 
thereon advanced for plaintiff's benefit by defendants Sather 
in connection with said land. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury on special interrogator-
ies. The jury found that plaintiff was the owner of the real 
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property and was entitled to possession upon paying to 
defendants Sather the sum of $21,500.00. The jury further 
found that a deed delivered to defendants Sather was to be 
a security device and that defendant Robert R. Sather had 
acted willfully and arbitrarily toward the plaintiff in 
taking possession of the property, but awarded no damages to 
the plaintiff as a consequence thereof. After the jury was 
discharged, the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion 
for a new trial on the issue of damages and the defendants' 
motion to add interest to the money found by the jury to be 
due from the plaintiff to the defendants as being monies 
advanced by Sather to defendant First Security Bank to obtain 
a release of the deed pledged for security on the loan. First 
Security Bank has been released by plaintiff as a party to 
this lawsuit after also being found guilty of willful mis-
conduct. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON CROSS-APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a new trial on the issue of damages 
in it's cross-appeal and to affirm the jury verdict as to the 
amount owed Sather for his equitable interest in the real 
property in question. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff agrees with the Statement of Facts set 
forth in defendants' brief with the following corrections and 
additions: 
-2-
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One plaintiff, Pete J. Buffo, and the defendant, 
Robert R. Sather, had known each other for about ten years 
during which they had been friends, money had been loaned 
back and forth for which no documentation was felt necessary. 
(TR-130, 65, 106) Defendant Sather negotiated with First 
Security Bank on behalf of Buffo, the principal and president 
of plaintiff Ute-Cal, who hereafter will jointly be referred 
to as plaintiff, for the loans from which this lawsuit arose 
(TR-61, 64, 65, lOS) and, on occasion, was authorized to 
write checks on plaintiff's account with First Security Bank 
(TR-83). For purposes of these facts, Bonnie Lee Sather 
only had a passive role as the wife of Robert R. Sather and 
all facts as between plaintiff and the sathers are applicable 
only to Robert R. Sather and hereafter reference to defendant 
does not include Bonnie Sather as her only liability is to 
re-convey to plaintiff. 
It was at the instigation of defendant that the 
trust deed note of October 11, 1972 (EX 22-P) was refinanced. 
As of September 15, 1973, the note was current with all payments. 
(TR-65, 80) Plaintiff agreed to refinance the note because 
defendant told him he needed $25,000 to buy diamonds and cover 
some overdraft checks. (TR-64, 65, 97) 
Plaintiff was not aware that the $25,000 was used 
to purchase a savings certificate and pledged as additional 
security on plaintiff's $50,000 loan. No pledge agreement 
was ever presented and this additional security was not 
-3-
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required by the Bank according to the information supplied 
plaintiff. The loan proceeds were distributed to Ute-Cal 
without any indication that $25,000 was to be pledged back 
to the Bank to secure the loan. (EX 30-P; TR-G4, 65, 67). 
Ute-Cal and Buffo signed an agreement dated 
September 15, 1973, (EX 3-P) which provided that if plaintiff 
defaulted on the renewal $50,000 note and defendant sub-
sequently paid the note as a guarantor, a deed to property 
known as the Moss Ranch would be given to defendant. The 
September 15, 1973 agreement on a carbon copy bore a cancell-
ation clause in handwriting signed by defendant which cancelled 
any security arrangement as between plaintiff and defendant 
regarding the escrowed warranty deed and permitted the return 
of the warranty deed to plaintiff upon finalizing of the 
renewal note with First Security Bank. (TR-66) Defendant 
denied ever seeing the September 16, 1973, document of can-
cellation and only admitted that it bore his signature after 
Robert Grube, a handwriting expert, was asked to authenticate 
his signature (EX 26-P; TR-172, 173). 
It was the understanding of plaintiff that both 
he and defendant would be responsible for making the payments 
on the $50,000 note (TR-124, 125) and that if plaintiff could 
make the first payment, defendant could probably handle the 
next two (TR-98). Plaintiff made the first payment of $5,000 
plus $1,500 interest on December 10, 1973 (TR-138), and 
assumed that defendant paid the $15,000 January payment. 
Plaintiff was not aware the note was in default until March 
when defendant visited him in California (TR-99). Shortly 
-4-
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after the defendant returned to Utah he made demand upon 
First Security Bank for the deed to the Moss Ranch (TR-194) 
and paid First Security Bank $46,500, $25,000 from the 
savings certificate and $21,500 personally. Plaintiff 
did make several offers to pay defendant for the re-conveyance 
of the Moss Ranch (TR-107). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT TOWARDS 
PLAINTIFF WAS SUFFICIENT FOR A FINDING BY THE JURY THAT 
DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS CONDUCT. 
In BEZNER V. CONTINENTAL DRY CLEANERS, INC. 584 
P.2d 898 the Court stated that it would not disturb the 
findings of the jury and the actions of the trial court 
" ... unless it appears that there is substantial prejudicial 
error, or that the evidence so clearly preponderates against 
them that we are persuaded that injustice has result." 
Since the defendant has made no showing of prejudice, he is 
basing his appeal on a claimed lack of evidence for the jury 
to make it's finding. 
The jury was instructed that in order to find the 
defendant acted with malice towards plaintiff, they must find 
that defendant had a motive and willingness to vex, harass, 
annoy or injure (Jury Instruction No. 25, R-516 ) . In 
determining that the defendant had such a motive, the jury had 
before it evidence that defendant: 
-5-
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1. Approached plaintiff with a request that plaintiff 
refinance the $20,000 with First Security Bank to the sum of 
$50,000 so that defendant could obtain $25,000 with which to 
cover over-drafts and buy diamonds (TR-64, 65, 97 ) . 
2. Renegotiated with First Security Bank the renewing 
of the note to the sum of $50,000 and agreed to act as a 
personal guarantor using as security the trust deed note to 
the Bank for the Moss Ranch (EX 24-P, 37-D; TR-67, 68). 
3. Informed plaintiff that the Bank would require 
an additional agreement providing that if plaintiff defaulted 
on the note and he was to pay it off, the Bank should deliver 
the warranty deed it held to the Moss Ranch to defendant 
(EX 3-P, TR-66). It was conceded by defendant that this was 
a security device for his benefit (TR-178). 
4. Agreed to cancel the warranty deed agreement 
(EX 3-P) as soon as the bank papers were signed renewing the 
note as an inducement to plaintiff to sign the warranty agree-
ment (TR-66). 
5. Signed a document (EX 4-P) cancelling the 
warranty deed agreement (EX 3-P) the day after the warranty 
deed agreement was signed by plaintiff for the renewal of the 
note, but failed to inform the Bank that the agreement had 
been cancelled (TR 180, 202). 
6. Accepted a check from plaintiff for $25,000 
from the proceeds of the $50,000 note, at 12% interest, and 
immediately purchased a savings certificate for $25,000 at 
-6-
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5 1/2% interest and pledged it as security on the $50,000 
note without informing plaintiff that this additional security 
was supposedly required, a hard to understand Bank requirement. 
Defendant didn't recall this transaction in his deposition 
(TR-277). 
7. Failed to make the second payment of $15,000 
on the $50,000 note as it carne due, after representing to 
plaintiff that he would do so (.TR-99), so that the note went 
into default. 
8. Without informing the plaintiff that the note 
was in default, make arrangements to pay off the note with 
the Bank, (TR-98) and then attempted to encumber the Moss 
Ranch to James Sheya on March 15, 1974, for $70,000 before 
paying off the note to the Bank (EX 9-P, 72-P). The pay off 
on the note was in part the $25,000 savings certificate which 
was deposited to defendant's bank account on March 18, 1974, 
and cashed on March 25, 1974 (TR-27). 
9. Accepted the warranty deed to the Moss Ranch 
from the Bank even though he had signed a document cancelling 
the agreement. 
10. Took an assignment of the trust deed note 
from the Bank and took possession of the Moss Ranch even 
though the warranty deed was only intended as a security device. 
11. Took economic advantage of ownership in the form 
of tax losses on the Moss Ranch in 1974, 1975, 1976 (EX 17, 
18, 19-P) and royalty payments for mineral rights (TR-271 ) . 
-7-
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This record of activity, while disputed in some 
points by the testimony of defendant, is sufficient to show 
an intent by defendant to systematically gain control of 
property belonging to plaintiff for a sum at a minimum of 
less than one-half of it's appraised value, accomplished by 
taking advantage of the trust and friendship which plaintiff 
had in defendant (TR-61, 65, 66, 106, 130). 
The jury was instructed that they were the ex-
clusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the 
weight of the evidence, had a right to consider the bias 
interests and motives of the witnesses, as well as their 
deportment, c~ndor and understanding of the facts in question. 
(Jury Instruction No. 3, R-493). The findings of the jury 
that the action of defendant in gaining control of the Moss 
Ranch amounted to willful and malicious conduct are certainly 
justified by evidence before the jury and should be upheld. 
POINT II 
THE JURY HAD EVIDENCE BEFORE IT TO FIND THAT 
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE THE SUM OF $21,500 FROM 
THE PLAINTIFF FOR RETURN OF THE MOSS RANCH. 
Plaintiff again points out to the Court that the 
findings of the jury are to be upheld unless the evidence 
so clearly preponderates against them that the Court concludes 
substantial injustice has resulted. 
-8-
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Appellant argues in his brief, page 17, that: 
" .•. there is absolutely no evidence in the record 
to indicate when the money ($25,000) was to be 
repaid by defendant Sather or that it was due 
when defendant Sather paid off the First Security 
Bank in March of 1974." 
Plaintiff testified that as part of the ongoing 
relationship of friendship and trust which existed between 
the parties, both parties were to be responsible for making 
payments on the $50,000 note. ~he arrangement was if he could 
make the first payment of $5,000 ?lus $1,500 interest, defen-
dant could probably handle t'l.e next t'\-10 payments or portions 
thereof (TR-98, 99). Having received no notice that the 
second payment v1as delinquent, plaintiff testified that he 
assumed defendant had the arrangements for repaying the loan 
under control (TR-94). 
In fact, defendant did not take care of the second 
payment vlhich was due in January of 1974. In March 1974 he 
violated the trust and friendship of plaintiff by obtaining 
the deed to the Moss Ranch in return for paying off the note 
using $21,500 of his own money and the savings certificate 
(TR-261). 
Plaintiff submits that this is sufficient evidence 
for the jury to base it's finding that plaintiff only owed 
defendant $21,500 in return for oossession of the Moss Ranch. 
POINT III 
THE COURT liTAS ACTING 'HTHIN IT'S PROPER AU~HORITY 
IN FAILD!G TO GRN!T DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO ADD INTEREST: 
-9-
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A. DEFENDANT SATHER WAIVED THE RIGHT TO INTEREST 
BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE SPECIAL VERDICT BEFORE THE JURY 
WAS DISMISSED. 
B. THE COURT, IN CONSIDERING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO ADD INTEREST, REVIEWED THE EVIDENCE AND FOUND THAT THE 
JURY COULD HAVE INCLUDED INTEREST IN THE AMOUNT FOUND TO BE 
DUE DEFENDANT. 
A. In LANGTON V. INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT, 26 U.2d 
452, 491 P.2d 1211 (1971) is clear authority for the proposition 
that a failure to object to an insufficiency in a special verdict 
before the jury is dismissed constitutes a waiver of any 
objection to that insufficiency. In so holding the Court 
quoted from BROWN V. REGAN 10 CAL.2d 519, 75 P.2d 1063, 1065-66 
(1938): 
" . . . The proper procedure where an informal or 
insufficient verdict has been returned is for the 
trial court to require the jury to return for further 
deliberation . 
. . . It is well established by numerous authorities 
that, when a verdict is not in the proper form 
and the jury is not required to clarify it, any 
error in said verdict is waived by the party relying 
thereon who at the time of it's rendition failed to 
make any request that it's informality or uncertainty 
be corrected ... " 
This holding was followed in COHN v. J.C. PENNY co., r 
537 P.2d 306 (1975), stating that where counsel failed to object 
to a special verdict and have the jury sent back for further 
deliberations, counsel had waived any error in the special verd:: 
In the case at hand the jury was asked if plaintiff 
was required to make a valid tender of $46,500, being the 
-10-
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amount paid by defendant to obtain the release of the 
warranty deed and assignment of trust deed and trust note 
from the Bank or any part thereof to defendant in order 
to regain possession of the Moss Ranch, which the jury 
answered in the affirmative (Special Verdict No. 12 R-600.) 
The jury was then asked if the plaintiff was entitled to 
the return of the Moss Ranch. It again answered "yes" 
(Special Verdict No. 13, R-600.) It was obvious that this 
special verdict was insufficient and at the request of the 
plaintiff after these verdicts were received and read, 
two additional interrogatories were submitted to the jury 
for their further deliberation. 
"14. Since your answer to Interrogatory No. 13 
is yes, does the plaintiff owe any sum of money to the 
defendant Sather? Yes x No 
15. If yes, how much? $21,500 " (R-601) 
The defendant waived his opportunity to question 
the jury as to how they reached this sum or if the jury 
considered or included interest in that sum or to have 
additional interrogatories inquire of the jury to clarify 
answer No. 15, i.e.: "plus or including interest, or plus 
interest at % rate". Apparently defendant assumes that 
because no specific references to interest were made in the 
special interrogatories or in the answers, the jury failed 
to include interest in arriving at the sum found to be owed 
-11-
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defendant. Assuming this to be true, the verdict was defective 
on it's face and the defendant, by failing to object before 
the jury was dismissed, waived his right to object to such 
defect. Since defendant renewed a $20,000 note for $50,000 
at 12% interest and received 5 l/2% interest on his savings 
certificate for one-half of the note, the jury just as reason-
ably could have assumed that each party should pay it's own 
interest expense. Further, but for the inducement to renew 
the note by defendant, plaintiff would not have been in 
the financial bind created by defendant's acts and therefore 
waiver of interest from the date of paying the Bank in March, 
1974 until date of jury verdict was a proper result. 
B. THE COURT AFTER REVIEWING THE EVIDENCE IN 
CONSIDERING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO ADD INTEREST FOUND THAT 
THE JURY INCLUDED INTEREST IN THE AMOUNT DUE DEFENDANT. 
RULE 49(a) U.R.C.P. provides in part as follows: 
"The Court shall give to the jury, such explanation 
and instruction concerning the matter thus submitted 
as may be necessary to enable the jury to make it's 
findings upon each issue. If in so doing, the 
Court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings 
or by the evidence, each party waives his right 
to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted, unless 
before the jury retires, he demands it's submission 
to the jury. As to any issue omitted without such 
demand, the Court may make a finding; or if it fails 
to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding 
in accordance with the judgment of the special verdi~ 
Pursuant to the above Rule, defendant submitted 
a proposed judgment on the verdict to the court below relative 
to the award of interest together with a motion to add interest 
After considering the above proposals and motions, the court 
-12-
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stated: 
"As to the issue of interest, the court after 
reviewing the evidence and the case authority 
submitted by counsel finds that the jury included 
interest in the amount found to be due to the 
defendants Sather ... It is the opinion of the 
Court that the jury was alert and considerate 
of all questions before it being in deliberation 
for the time as noted above (about 10 hours). 
The Court in reviewing their answers to the 
questions on special verdict form finds that 
a portion of the interest assessed to the 
defendant Sather by the defendant First Security 
Bank was included in the amount found to be 
due the Defendant Sather ... " (R-669). 
It should again be noted that the defendant 
collected approximately $1,000 interest on the savings 
certificate when it was cashed in (TR-252) and had the use 
or rental value of the Moss Ranch from March, 1974 to 
the time of trial. 
The court below acknowledged that it had authority 
under RULE 49(a), U.R.C.P. and the case of MOURIKAS V. 
VARDIANOS, 169 F. 2d 53, to award interest on the amount 
found due but declined to do so because, as MOURIKAS 
points out: 
" ... ordinarily the question of whether or not 
interest should be allowed and from what date 
is for the jury" 
and was of the opinion the jury had included interest in 
it's award (R-667). 
As pointed out above, defendant had an opportunity 
to request a breakdown of the amount due or failed to do so. 
Having failed to do so, the defendant waived his right to 
object to the insufficiency of the verdict. The verdict of 
the jury and the rulings of the trial court are to be given 
-13-
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every benefit of the doubt and are to be upheld so long as they 
are supported by: 
" ... evidence which, together with the fair inferences 
that may be drawn therefrom, reasonable minds could 
conclude as the jury did." GORDON V. PROVO CITY, 
15 UT 2d 287, 391 P.2d 430 (1964) 
Plaintiff submits there is substantial evidence to support 
the verdict of the jury and the ruling of the trial court 
denying defendant's motion to add interest and this Court 
should deny defendant's appeal. 
PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-APPEAL 
THE EVIDENCE REQUIRED A FINDING BY THE JURY THAT 
PLAINTIFF SUFFERED DAMAGES FROM THE WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS 
CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANT IN TAKING TITLE TO THE MOSS RANCH 
AND THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED IT'S DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT A NEW TRIAL ON THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES. 
"The fundamental principle of damages is to restore 
the injured party to the position he would have been 
in had it not been for the wrong of the other party." 
HILL V. VARNER 4 UT 2d 166, 241 P.2d 448 citing 
PARK V. MOORMAN MANFACTURING CO., 241 P.2d 914 
RULE 59(a} U.R.C.P. was created to give the trial 
judge authority to grant a new trial when: 
"It seems clear that the jury has missapplied or 
failed to take into account proven facts, or mis-
understood or disregarded the law; or made findings 
clearly against the weight of the evidence." 
WELLMAN V. NOBLE 12 UT 2d 350, 336 P.2d 701 at 703 
c~ting HOLMES V. NELSON 7 UT 2d 435 at 437, 441; 
326 P.2d 722 at 725. 
In BODON V. SUHRMANN, 8 UT 2d 42, 327 P.2d 826, 
the Court ordered the defendant to accept an additor to $500 
-14-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
or face a new trial after the jury awarded the plaintiff 
only $100 in damages. The Court noted that it was undisputed 
the plaintiff had lost a total of $64.00 in out of pocket 
damages, leaving only $31.00 as general damages for the "pain, 
distress and inconvenience of having the disease." It then 
said: 
"We affirm the responsibility of this Court to 
be indulgent toward the verdict of the jury, 
and not to disturb it so long as it is within 
the bounds of reason . . . also that it is 
primarily the prerogative and duty of the trial 
court to pass upon the adequacy of the verdict 
and to order any necessary modification thereof. 
Nevertheless, when the verdict is outside the 
limits of any reasonable appraisal of damages 
as shown by the evidence, it should not be per-
mitted to stand, and if the trial court fails 
to rectify it, we are obligated to make the 
correction on appeal." 327 P.2d at 830 citing 
JENSEN V. DENVER & R.G.R.R. CO. 44 Ut. 100, 
138 P. at 1192. 
Plaintiff submits that the instant case falls 
within RULE 59(a) (6) U.R.C.P. as interpreted in BODEN V. 
SUHRMANN. Defendant testified that he received "one or two 
royalty payments of $260.00" for mineral rights during his 
occupancy of the Moss Ranch (TR-271). While the exact amount 
of royalties defendant received may be uncertain, it is un-
disputed that he did receive royalties and had possession 
of the property. The jury's finding of no damages suffered 
by plaintiff is to this extent outside the limits of any 
reasonable appraisal of damages as shown by the evidence, 
against the law, and the fundamental principal of damages. 
These facts are similar to the Utah case of HILL V. 
VARNER, Supra. in which there was nothing in the record 
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refuting the fact of physical damage which the trial court 
had determined was due to the negligence of the defendant. 
The trial court awarded only nominal damages because the 
actual amount of physical damage incurred had not been 
established to it's satisfaction. On appeal the case was 
reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue of damages 
alone because: 
. the injured party had not been restored to 
the position it would have been had it not been for t~ 
wrong of the other party." 
The jury's verdict in the instant case is especially 
inadequate because by finding that there were no actual 
damages suffered by the plaintiff the jury was prevented 
from considering whether punitive damages should be assessed 
against the defendant for his "willful and malicious" conduct. 
The jury was instructed that it could consider: 
"In any punitive damage awarded to plaintiff 
it's attorney's fee incurred in bringing this 
civil action in the amount of which was $11,500." 
(Jury Instruction No. 24, R-515) 
The jury's verdict not only fails to restore the injured 
party to it's original position, but thereafter allows the 
defendant by his willful and malicious actions, to force 
plaintiff to incur $11,500 in attorney fees to regain control 
over property which was rightfully theirs. 
The reason for limiting a retrial to a single issue 
is set forth in 58 AM, JUR. 2d, NEW TRIAL, § 22, P.210. 
"The guiding principle is that although a verdict 
ought not to stand which is tainted with illegality, 
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there ought to be but one fair trial upon any issue, 
and that parties ought not to be compelled to try 
anew a question once disposed of by a decision 
against which no illegality can be shown. Thus the 
parties and the state have been saved the expense, 
annoyance, and delay of a retrial of issues once 
settled by a trial as to which no reversible error 
appears." 
In 58 AM JUR. 2d NEW TRIAL § 27 the principles 
governing the propriety of limiting a new trial to the issue 
of damages are expressed: 
"As in any other case, to justify limiting a new 
trial to the single issue of damages it must appear 
that the issue is clearly severable from the other 
issues in the case, and that a retrial limited to 
the issue of damages may be had \vithout injustice 
... Yet, when the Court is convinced upon review 
of the whole case that the jury have settled the 
issue as to responsibility fairly and upon sufficient 
evidence - so that disassociated from other questions 
it ought to stand as the final adjudication of the 
rights of the parties - and that there has been such 
error in the determination of damages as to require 
the setting aside of the verdict, a new trial as 
to damages alone may properly be ordered although 
this cuts off evidence which, if introduced with 
respect to other issues, might mitigate damages, 
all such evidence being admissable as to damages." 
See also PHILLIPS V. CLEEVER 187 P.2d 80 (Cal.) 
The verdict in the case at hand was divided into 
fifteen special verdicts so that the liability of defendant 
was established without equivocation. The various issues 
were separated making it possible to limit a new trial to 
damages without injustice. Questions 1, 2, 3 and 13 establish 
the liability of the defendant. Questions 8 and 10 establish 
that the defendant acted willfully and maliciously. Questions 
12, 13 14 and 15 dealt with the right of return of the Moss 
Ranch to the plaintiff, while questions 4, 5, 6 and 7 dealt 
with actual damages and 9 and 11 with punitive damages. The 
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question of damages could be retried without considering 
the issue of liability or the mechanics of the return of the 
Moss Ranch to the plaintiff. 
If in a new trial it was determined that actual 
damages should be assessed, the Court could admit all evidence 
of the willfulness and malice of the defendants in order to 
determine whether punitive damages should be assessed. This 
is analogous to a comparative negligence situation. In 
58 AM. JR. 2d NEW TRIAL § 27 P. 213 the general rule is 
expressed thusly: 
"Where the verdict on the first trial establishes 
the responsibility of the defendant the new trial 
may be confined to the issue of damages, but the 
Court will admit all evidence bearing on the neg-
ligence of the defendant and the contributory 
negligence of the plaintiff so as to permit the 
application of the rule on comparative negligence." 
(if applicable) See CASTER V. MOELLER 176 NEB. 
446, 126 N.W. 2d 485 
There have been a number of cases in which courts 
have ordered a new trial to be held on the issue of exemplary 
or punitive damages or in conjunction with a new trial limited 
to the issue of damages, punitive damages have also been 
retried. In FOSTER V. KEATING 261 P.2d 529 (CAL) and MONAHAN 
V. METROPOLITAN NATIONAL BANK 500 P.2d 158 (COLO 1972) the 
Courts held that where both compensatory and exemplary damages 
could be awarded and a new trial was ordered on the issue of 
compensatory damages, a redetermination of exemplary damages 
would also be required. Following this reasoning, in the 
instant case if a new trial is awarded on the issue of damages 
it should include a redetermination of both compensatory 
and punitive damages. 
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A final issue which must be dealt with on appeal 
is the possibility that the plaintiff has waived his right 
to ask for a partial new trial by failing to ask the jury to 
consider the damage issue further beforeit's dismissal. 
Restating LANGTON V. INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT COMPANY, Supra,: 
"When a verdict is not in proper form and the jury 
is not required to clarify it, any error in said 
verdict is waived by the party relying thereon 
who at the time of it's rendition failed to make 
any request that it's informality or uncertainty 
be corrected." 
A close reading of LANGON and COHN, Supra, along 
with SUNILAND CORP. V. RADCLIFFE 576 P.2d 805, indicates 
that the purpose for this ruling was to control the termination 
of litigation and prevent a party from gaining an unfair 
strategic advantage by gaining a new trial before a more 
sympathetic jury. See LANGTON 491 P.2d at 1215. The 
defect must be apparent on the face of the verdict so that 
counsel would be aware that the verdict is deficient before 
waiver occurs. See dissention opinion of Justice Manghan in 
SUNILAND 567 P.2d at 850. 
In the instant case, it would appear at first glance 
that an award of no general damages would be a patently 
insufficient verdict, putting counsel on notice. However, 
this is a complex case with several issues. The original 
verdict was deficient in more than one area. Counsel for 
the plaintiff did send the jury back to clarify it's verdict 
by answering two additional special interrogatories on money 
owed defendant (TR-323, 328). 
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However, the jury having found plaintiff had sustained no 
general damages and therefore could not award punitive damages 
as heretofore discussed, plaintiff's only alternative was 
RULE 59(a) U.R.C.P. Plaintiff's counsel therefore sought 
to permit the trial judge to correct the no damages error 
in a motion for a new trial which was denied notwithstanding 
the clear and uncontroverted evidence of the receipt of 
royalty payments and use of the Moss Ranch by plaintiff 
for over four years. 
Unlike LANGTON there is no evidence that this was 
a compromise verdict which compelled correcting. The jury 
was consistent in it's findings in favor of the plaintiff 
in establishing the willful and malicious nature of defendant's 
actions and the right of the plaintiff to a return of property. 
For the Court to have directed the jury to return and reconsider 
a specific interrogatory on which an unequivocal negative 
finding had been made could well constitute a comment on 
the evidence by the trial judge or a directing of a verdict 
by the trial judge that damages occurred, either of which 
at that point in a jury trial would probably constitute 
reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
The verdict of the jury with respect to it's 
finding of willful and malicious action on the part of 
defedant Robert R. Sather is fully supported by evidence 
submitted to the jury for it's consideration. Likewise 
the verdict of the jury with respect to it's finding that 
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the defendant is entitled to the sum of $21,500 is supported 
by competent and substantial evidence and this Court should 
uphold the jury in it's findings. 
The refusal of the court below to add interest to 
the amount due from the plaintiff is a correct interpretation 
of the law and supported by evidence that the jury considered 
interest in determining the amount due to the defendant from 
plaintiff. In any event, the defendant waived any defect in 
the jury's verdict and finding on the amount defendant could 
recover by failing to object to the jury's findings before 
the jury was dismissed. 
The verdict of the jury with respect to it's finding 
of no damages suffered by plaintiff from the willful and 
malicious conduct of defendant in gaining control of the Moss 
Ranch is outside the limits of a reasonable appraisal of 
damages and should not be permitted to stand. The court below 
abused it's discretion in refusing to grant a new trial on the 
issue of damages and the rules of the court below on that 
motion should be reversed and this case remanded for a new 
trial on the issue of damages. 
-21-
Respectfully submitted, 
McRAE AND DeLAND 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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